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*File
CSS Coins Upgrading*IHC-M-50
20 November 1972

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HANDLING COMMITTEE

Minutes of the Fiftieth Meeting, 18 October 1972Members or Representatives Present

Chairman	-	[REDACTED]	DCI/IC	25X1
CIA	-	Mr. Charles A. Briggs		
State	-	Mr. William P. Deary		
DIA	-	[REDACTED]		25X1
NSA	-			
Army	-	Col. Patrick A. Ulmen		
Navy	-	Capt. Leonard E. Tillerson		
Secretary	-	[REDACTED]	IHC/SS	25X1

Others Present

CIA	-	[REDACTED]	25X1
NSA	-		
Navy	-	Mr. Edward L. Barker	

Secretary's Note

1. Attendance at this meeting was restricted to members and those the members felt would be useful contributors to the discussions of the agenda items.

Approval of Minutes

2. The minutes of the previous meeting (IHC-M-49, 12 October 1972) were approved without changes.

Appointment of New Executive Secretary

3. The Chairman announced that after five years on the Staff, [REDACTED] is returning to CIA to replace Mr. [REDACTED] on Mr. Briggs' staff. The new Executive Secretary, IHC is [REDACTED] from CIA's Office of Computer Services. The Chairman congratulated [REDACTED] for an

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outstanding job with the Staff. Mr. Deary moved and it was unanimously seconded that the minutes show a vote of appreciation for all that [] had done.

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4. The Chairman has discussed with [] a list of projects, problems and ideas in which the Committee should become involved. After [] has been thoroughly briefed by the IHC members and has received other specific briefings, he will develop recommendations and a plan of attack. [] will coordinate the briefings by the Services.

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6. Mr. Briggs mentioned a proposal by Dr. A. Michael Noll of OST, with OMB involvement, that computer security is a problem and must be translated into some kind of action. One proposal is that Dr. Ruth Davis of the NBS be the focal point for the public sector on this matter and the most interested party in the intelligence community would obviously be NSA. [] replied that NSA was discussing this matter, but there is a question of resources and alternatives. The question appears to be: "Should some agency in the U.S. Government be assigned the responsibility for computer security?" Mr. Briggs thought that there should be discussions between USIB and USCSB on this subject. [] was requested to follow CSS/SECOM activity on upgrading COINS to the TK level.

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7. Mr. Barker discussed the problem about varying interpretations of DCID 1/16 which arose after an examination of terminal security at FICPAC. He thought that DCID 1/16 should be updated. The Chairman remarked that now, when they are rewriting the DCIDs, is an appropriate time to do so. Mr.

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Briggs remarked that it is very difficult to certify the security of a system which might be modified the next day, and that DCID 1/16 can only be a policy guide. He questioned whether there really needed to be DCIDs on such technical questions and suggested there should be back-up documentation on things required to build networks, including: standards, computer security, solutions and things of that sort. [] remarked that the Commands badly need guidance now; they are uncertain about the security of some of their internal systems. Mr. Deary said, in his opinion, the DCID form had often been used to help USIB members in dealing with their own organizations, and as semi-statutes had often proven helpful in this context, but, in the final analysis, under all DCIDs the principal must be the judge. The Chairman said that [] memo had exposed an obvious problem, and he will ask Mr. Pettibone to confer with the IHC before publishing a replacement for DCID 1/16.

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National Intelligence Program Memorandum (NIPM) Discussions

8. The NIPM has several general paragraphs on the development of a community information network. Specifically COINS is being evaluated under the aegis of IRAC by [] DASD/I. The DCI indicated a strong desire to have users' groups well represented on [] group. The Chairman and [] thought that the group's terms of reference did not focus sharply enough on COINS, and attempted to do too much. Action on this item is being handled separately by the DCI/IC Staff.

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9. The Chairman was to meet a group from OMB to discuss this area. (Questions had been distributed to the members.) In discussing the topics the Committee agreed that it is very difficult for systems to do what OMB is looking for--the same work at decreased cost. At best, systems usually give more capability at the same cost. If the OMB group had questions on costs, the Chairman would refer them to [] and the NIPM and will point out that until this year it was impossible to identify money going into the network development, since it was put into budgets for other things--hardware, training, etc.

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10. The Chairman asked if the members had any axes to grind, such as cut projects for which he could intercede. [] and [] were very concerned that Dr. Hall has not yet released the money for COINS and DELTA (formerly JIRN). Mr. Briggs had the impression that since this was also their first year with the NIPM, the OMB people weren't quite sure how to proceed either--hence "discussions" rather than "hearings." [] said that due to a misunderstanding OMB is expecting the DIA to present a plan for the community system communications network, rather than the planned automated information exchange system which incidentally uses communications. Also, after being told by OSD to

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be specific in defining an effort to perform R&D and design work in support of current intelligence and warning, such as DELTA, they are now criticized by OMB for being too specific.

11. Mr. Deary pointed out that there are really two types of analysts: the first; capable of using a lot of machined data, and the second; a current intelligence type, still wedded to text in hard copy. Mr. Briggs pointed out that in CIA the latter type still dominates, though there are many organizations using remote terminals and computer assistance. Mr. Deary and [] both had examples of traditional analysts favorably impressed with the CSOC operation. [] thought that as a final point, the OMB people must face the alternative to better exchange of information.

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12. Mr. Briggs could not agree with everything in [] paper; however, he did find it to be an extremely useful articulation of the problem area. He thought too many people were getting the same things and that processing centers performing a filtering function, like NPIC, FMSAC, or DEFSMAC, were a good thing. [] said they were absolutely essential, but had grown without examining whether the filter really works or is clogged up; he added that perhaps the analyst is not aware of what is really available. CSOC, for example, processes material in a few minutes, but the information goes to users slowly (by teletype). Mr. Briggs questioned whether most analysts need so much data so quickly. He stated that within a decade there probably will be executive agents assigned to build files and maintain them for remote query, because by then no one could afford to handle all the data. The biggest stumbling block to this is the analysts' reluctance to use another agency's files. [] pointed out that even today analysts are dependent on other agencies filtering; NSA for example. Mr. Briggs stated that CIA has always insisted on full dissemination; however, if we can get a firm agreement that the files will be built and maintained, according to certain standards, it will be a major step forward. Mr. Deary pointed out that most analysts at State do not need the masses of discrete data that NSA can send, but also resist using summaries. But still they've made no distinction in what should come in by teletype--other agencies must have similar problems.

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Reorganization of IHC Subcommittees

13. The Chairman questioned whether the present organization of the Committee and the Support Staff is adequate to handle our work. Rather than the present three subcommittees, perhaps we should have a subcommittee on User Requirements, an ADP

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Systems Subcommittee (which would include R&D), and a Teleprocessing Subcommittee, which would absorb that portion of [redacted] Telecommunications Working Group of USIB concerned with the use of telecommunications as part of the processing system. [redacted] thought it was healthy to look at other orientations since the subcommittees are practically inactive. He stated that it's very healthy to think of other orientation for both the subcommittees as well as emphasis for the staff; we ought to give [redacted] a chance to get his feet on the ground and get involved in the recommendations. The Chairman said that the reason for having the User Study Group this summer was that we were not organized to do this analysis ourselves. Mr. Briggs thought it would be psychologically advantageous to have such a subcommittee; it would help convince managers that there is, in fact, a user input to systems.

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14. The Chairman suggested there might be some structure other than subcommittees, perhaps working groups. Mr. Briggs pointed out that subcommittees under the present DCIDs have to be approved by the DCI; working groups don't. [redacted] and Col. Ulmen preferred task-oriented working groups. The Chairman stated that he is having [redacted] identify for IHC the tasks that need to be looked at; then we'll get a group of people contributed by IHC members and headed by [redacted] or someone else to look at each problem.

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15. Col. Ulmen stated that from the Army's point of view, the most important task is a solution to the multi-level security problem. A solution must be found as soon as possible, perhaps via a milestone-oriented, product-oriented task group monitored and managed by the IHC to generate policy papers and actions. He does not believe that there should be a delay until guidance comes from the Computer Security Subcommittee. They are still waiting for the results of the DIAOLS test; meanwhile hardware is being deployed and a prompt solution to the security problem is required.

16. Mr. Briggs pointed out the DCI's Congressionally-assigned responsibility to protect sources and methods. [redacted] favored drafting such a task statement as Col. Ulmen suggested. [redacted] said that delay adds to the security problem. Mr. Deary stated there should be no agonizing over "need to know"; each agency has always been the judge of who has the need to know. Mr. Briggs stated that technology has put the problem beyond the control of the releasing agency. Because of analysts' needs there had been several suggestions to USIB that these compartments be abolished, but they weren't ready for that yet.

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17. The Chairman requested that all members give some thought to reorganizing the structure of the Support Staff; he said that ad hoc committees are great for certain tasks but that he does not want to operate on the basis of ad hoc subcommittees. With permanent subcommittees, he stated, you can operate more effectively and efficiently.

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Other Business

18. The Chairman asked the members to meet with [] and go over the list he has prepared with him, and familiarize him with their problems and projects. He wanted [] to thoroughly familiarize [] with COINS including sub-studies.

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19. The Chairman added that if the new DCIDs are accepted, one will be an overall general DCID saying how the DCID structure is going to operate and that the chairmen and committees will be responsible for their own organizations.

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Next Meeting

20. The next meeting is scheduled for 15 November 1972.

[]

Executive Secretary

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